Regulatory Induced Performance Persistence: Evidence from Hedge Funds by Cumming, Douglas et al.
Regulatory induced performance persistence: Evidence from hedge funds☆
Douglas Cumming
a,⁎, Na Dai
b, Lars Helge Haß
c, Denis Schweizer
d
a York University—Schulich School of Business, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3
b Center for Institutional Investment Management, School of Business, SUNY at Albany, 1400 Washington Ave, Albany, NY 12222, United States
c Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, United Kingdom
d WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management, 56179 Vallendar, Germany
article info abstract
Article history:
Received 4 August 2011
Received in revised form 23 June 2012
Accepted 26 June 2012
Available online 3 July 2012
This paper tests the idea that financial regulation can impact performance persistence in the
context of the hedge fund industry in 48 countries over the years 1994–2008. The data show
evidence of three types of regulation influencing performance persistence: (1) minimum capital
restrictions, which restrict lower quality funds and hence increase the likelihood of performance
persistence, (2) restrictions on location of key service providers, which restrict human capital
choicesandhencetendtomitigateperformancepersistence,and(3)distributionchannels,which
makefundperformancemoreopaque,decreasethelikelihoodofperformancepersistence.Wedo
not find evidence that distribution channels, that promote fund presence to institutional
investors, enhance performance persistence. Finally, we show differences in the effect of
regulation on persistence by fund quartile ranking.












“Hedge funds are concerned that compliance with reporting regulations proposed by the U.S. futures regulator last week will
require too much time and money, creating an unnecessary cost burden for the industry.”
Reuters, 31 January 2011
This paper examines the role of financial regulation on performance persistence in financial intermediaries. Prior work has
shown regulation can affect performance persistence of banks in cross-country evidence (Barth et al., 2002), but there is less
evidence in other contexts and no evidence in the context of alternative investments. Herein we examine the specific empirical
context of hedge funds. In view of recent proposals in Europe and the U.S., among other countries, to increase regulation of hedge
fund regulation after the 2008 financial crisis, we believe it is important and worthwhile to examine financial regulation and
performance persistence in hedge funds. Hedge fund regulation significantly differs across countries and in some cases also
Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2012) 1005–1022
☆ We owe thanks to Jeffry Netter (the editor), an anonymous referee, Jerry Cao, Melvyn Teo, Soﬁa Johan, Kate Litvak, the seminar participants at the Canadian
Law and Economics Association Annual Conference (University of Toronto, September 2011), the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Northwestern
University, September 2011), Singapore Management University (December 2001), and the Eastern Finance Association 2012 Annual Meeting (Boston, April
2012).
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 416 736 2100x77942; fax: +1 416 736 5687.
E-mail addresses: dcumming@schulich.yorku.ca (D. Cumming), ndai@albany.edu (N. Dai), l.h.hass@lancaster.ac.uk (L.H. Haß), denis.schweizer@whu.edu
(D. Schweizer).
URL's: http://ssrn.com/author=75390, http://www.schulich.yorku.ca/SSB-Extra/Faculty.nsf/faculty/Cumming+Douglas (D. Cumming).
0929-1199/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcorpﬁn.2012.06.009
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Corporate Finance
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfinchanges over time. There are key differences in permissible distribution channels, minimum capitalization requirements, and
restrictions in the location of key service providers. We conjecture that such regulations strongly impact performance persistence.
Some types of hedge fund regulation clearly have the potential to mitigate performance persistence. First, restrictions on the
location of key service providers potentially reduce persistence where such restrictions only enable access to inferior quality
service providers. Second, minimum capitalization requirements mitigate the presence of low quality funds and thereby increase
the likelihood of persistent performance. Third, distribution channels provide access to key institutional investors that facilitate
capital flows as well as deal flow and networks to information, due diligence and governance teams (and thereby better
performance; Clifford, 2008; Chou et al., 2011). Distribution channels that mitigate a fund's presence to important investors are
more likely to curtail performance persistence. Fourth, distribution channels that make investment performance opaque, such as
wrapper distributions which by virtue tying financial products together, would mitigate the potential for performance
persistence.
We examine these propositions using an international CISDM dataset of hedge funds from 48 countries over the years 1994–
2008 and for 8641 funds. The CISDM dataset has been used in other recent work on hedge funds (e.g., Bollen and Pool, 2008,
2009). We merge the dataset with information on hedge fund regulation that significantly varies across countries and to a smaller
degree also varies across time (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2007). We focus our analysis on performance persistence across
successive periods of 3-year alphas (and 1-year alphas as robustness) using panel data analyses, and discuss robustness to
alternative specifications.
Our findings indicate hedge fund performance persistence depends to a nontrivial degree on hedge fund regulation. First,
minimum capital requirements restrict lower quality funds from entering the market, and as such, funds in jurisdictions with
great minimum capital restrictions show greater performance persistence. Second, fund in jurisdictions which restricts the
location of key service providers tend to have worse performance persistence. Service providers include a fund's administrator,
custodian, investment advisor, auditors, legal and tax advisors, accountants, and consultants. It is very important for funds to have
high quality service providers, and there are even institutional investor guides to finding suitable service providers.
1 Restrictions
on the location of a fund's service provider force the fund to make choices it might otherwise not have made, which in turn lower
the likelihood of performance persistence. Third, we find evidence that permissible distribution channels such as wrappers
(which combine different types of financial products) mitigate the strength of signals to attract higher quality investors that
would enable performance persistence.
We carry out a number of robustness checks in the course of our analyses. For instance, we show differences in the effect of
regulation on persistence by fund quartile ranking. We also consider the robustness of our results to alternative econometric
specifications of our tests, including but not limited to autoregressive specifications, as well as pooling and clustering standard
errors by time period and fund. We further consider robustness to selection effects in terms of Heckman (1976, 1979) selection
for choice of offshore jurisdiction as well as funds that do and do not have consecutive years of performance persistence data,
robustness to excluding certain countries, and robustness to selection for the probability that a fund has survived sufficiently long
in the dataset to report multiperiod returns. Our findings are quite robust and highlight the important role of financial regulation
on performance persistence.
We note that our findings do not imply that funds seeking consistent top quartile returns can seek regulations that cause them
to always be in the top quartile. Nevertheless, our findings do imply that some regulations are better able to facilitate persistence
in the top quartile among fund managers with skill to obtain top quartile performance results. Similarly, our results also do imply
that lower quality funds are able to remain in the bottom quartiles without disappearing from the market where regulations
makes their persistent underperformance less transparent to institutional investors, such as jurisdictions which permit wrapper
distributions.
This paper is related to other work on hedge fund performance persistence, as well as other papers on hedge fund regulation.
Performance persistence has been examined in other hedge fund contexts by Agarwal and Naik (2000), Agarwal et al. (2006,
2007), Baquero et al. (2005), Cassar and Gerakos (2009), Ding and Shawky (2007), Eling (2009), Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2000,
2001, 2004), Fung et al. (2008), Jagannathan et al. (2010), Koh et al. (2003), Liang (2000, 2003), Naik et al. (2007), Teo (2009),
among others. Fund regulation and governance has been considered in the U.S. by Hu and Black (2007), Brown et al. (2008),
Verret (2007), Cassar and Gerakos (forthcoming), and internationally by Cumming and Dai (2009, 2010a,b) and Cumming and
Johan (2008). Prior work, however, has not examined impact of regulation on performance persistence in the hedge fund context,
or for that matter in any other similar context to the best of our knowledge.
Our findings have important implications for policy as well as other hedge fund research. Our findings show hedge fund
regulation has the ability to facilitate top quartile performance when it is structured properly, thereby benefiting investors. But
hedge fund regulation can likewise facilitate consistently poor performance when it is improperly structured, thereby worsening
investor welfare. Our findings are important for other academic work on hedge funds as we show, consistent with our other
recent work on topic (Cumming and Dai, 2009, 2010a,b), that hedge fund regulation is important to consider when using
international hedge fund datasets in contexts related to fund structure and performance, particularly performance persistence.
This paper is organized as follows. Hypotheses are presented in Section 2. The data and summary statistics are introduced in
Section 3. Section 4 provides multivariate tests, and discusses other extensions and robustness checks. Concluding remarks follow
in the last section.
1 See, e.g., http://www.iihedgefundguide.com/.
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Hedge funds are typically formed as limited partnerships whereby the investors are considered limited partners and the hedge
fund managers are general partners. The implementation of hedge fund investment strategies are facilitated by various external
service providers, as depicted in Fig. 1. Outsourcing a hedge fund's functions to service providers minimizes the risk of collusion
among hedge fund participants to perpetuate fraud, and also mitigates liability in the event the hedge fund participants are
accused of improperly performing their management duties. A hedge fund's board of directors or trustee has a fiduciary duty to
the investors to ensure that all parties involved in the fund can properly carry out their designated tasks. The hedge fund
managers may have assisting them other investment and professional advisors such as lawyers, accountants, consultants and tax
and audit specialists. There are the administrators that assist the fund managers in providing fund administrative and accounting
services, including record keeping, independent valuation of investments and meeting disclosure requirements. The registrar or
transfer agent may assist the manager in processing subscriptions and redemptions and in maintaining the register of
shareholders. Sometimes, depending on the structure of the fund and the manager, these duties may be carried out internally by
the fund manager. The actual financing arrangements and execution of investments are carried out by prime brokers which can
be either securities firms or banks. Occasionally, the prime brokers decide to set up their own fund, and they therefore also
become hedge fund managers. There is of course another service provider, the custodian that has custody over the fund assets.
In many countries around the world there are restrictions on the location of key service providers to be within the same
jurisdiction in which the fund is registered, as well as minimum capital requirements for hedge fund managers to operate a hedge
fund, as well as different avenues for marketing (not merely private placements
2) (see Fig. 1). These regulations are summarized
for 2008 in Table 1 for 48 different countries (see PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2007, for an extended discussion for most of
these countries). We make use of time varying changes in these regulations (albeit these regulations do not often change over
time).
3
At issue in this paper is whether different forms of regulatory oversight in different countries mitigates the presence of risky
funds and facilitates additional value-added governance; if so, we would expect hedge funds in jurisdictions with such regulation
to exhibit performance persistence. First, and perhaps most straightforwardly, minimum capitalization requirements mitigate the
presence of low quality funds and thereby increase the likelihood of persistent performance, especially among the most marginal
and smaller funds in the bottom quartile.
Second, restrictions on the location of key service providers may constrain the fund to an inefficient scale, give rise to
inefficient choice of human resources associated with hedge fund management, create barriers to entry, and limit investor
participation most suited to the particular hedge fund's strategy (Wilson, 2007). The most common service providers include
prime brokers, administrators, and distributors. Prime brokers lend money, act as counterparts to derivative contracts, lend
securities in short sales, execute trades, and provide clearing, settlement, and custody services. Administrators issue and redeem
interests and shares and calculate the net asset value (NAV) of the fund. Distributors are responsible for marketing the fund to
potential investors. Restrictions on location of key service providers typically require the presence of a local agent
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2007). Service providers are vitally important because they provide due diligence services for
the fund, provide research on counter-party risk, and generally facilitate the execution of the fund's activities. A fund's
relationship with its service providers involves substantial human capital and asset specificity. Lower cost service providers can
save on fees, but such cost savings can drastically hurt fund performance due to the reduction in auditor timing and support,
inaccurate auditing services, enhanced counter-party risk, slower execution, delayed custody services, and conflicts of interest in
marketing the fund. Restrictions on the location of key service providers potentially reduce persistence where such restrictions
only enable access to inferior quality service providers.
Third, there is an oft-repeated view in the hedge fund industry that fund distribution channels can facilitate performance
persistence.
4 Distribution channels provide access to key institutional investors that facilitate capital flows as well as deal flow
and networks to information, due diligence and governance teams. Therefore, distribution channels that promote a fund's
presence to key institutional investors will facilitate performance persistence.
Fourth, distribution channels that make fund performance more opaque have the potential to be associated with lower fund
performance. Wrappers, i.e. securities whose returns tie together different financial products, bear a potential conflict of interest
between the sponsor and the fund manager with respect to the disclosure of the wrapper relating to the Fund Manager (Gerstein,
2006). Wrapper constructions are often complex and inapprehensible for the average investor, thereby lowering the governance
that hedge fund investors would otherwise provide. Empirical evidence confirms wrapper distributions are associated with a
“flatter” or less sensitive flow–performance relationship (Cumming and Dai, 2009); that is, investors are less likely to withdraw
from poor performers and enter better performers. Wrapper distributions are likewise associated with more frequent
misreporting of returns (Cumming and Dai, 2010b) and worse overall performance (Cumming and Dai, 2010a). Overall, we may
2 Hedge funds in the U.S. are distributed only as private placements. In a private placement, there typically are not more than 35 “accredited” investors,
whereby an accredited investor is someone with more than $1 million in wealth or who earned more than $200,000 in the previous two years. Hedge funds are
not allowed to advertise in the U.S. There is no restriction on the minimum size to operate as a hedge fund, and no restriction on the location of key service
providers. Prior to February 2006, hedge funds in the U.S. were also exempt from any registration requirement (Brown et al., 2008).
3 The majority of countries and years are available in PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006, 2007). For countries/years not available by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, we
obtained information regarding regulation on the hedge funds in a survey sent to selected funds.
4 Mark Cobley, “Threadneedle: ‘We are worth a second look’,” 01 November 2010, http://www.eﬁnancialnews.com.
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persistence.
In sum, we expect restrictions regarding the location of hedge fund key service providers, minimum capital restrictions, and
permissible distribution channels all to affect fund performance persistence, as stated in the four testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Minimum capital restrictions increase the probability of performance persistence.
Hypothesis 2. Restrictions on the location of key service providers decrease the probability of performance persistence.
Hypothesis 3. Distribution channels that promote a fund's presence to institutional investors, such as distribution by banks, fund
distribution companies, and other regulated financial services institutions, will increase the probability of performance
persistence.
Hypothesis 4. Distribution channels that make fund performance more opaque, such as wrappers, and distributions directly
through investment managers themselves without certification of external agents, will decrease the probability of performance
persistence.
The differences in hedge fund regulation around the world are summarized in Table 1 (these regulations are summarized for
2008, the most recent year in our dataset). Table 1 likewise presents information on other country differences, legal origin, GDP
per capita, and the number of hedge funds by country in the CISDM dataset. The CISDM dataset is described further in the next
section, along with summary statistics and comparison tests.
3. Data
3.1. Data source
In the empirical analysis, we use the Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM) data, a dataset used
by other leading hedge fund papers (e.g., Bollen and Pool, 2009). We focus on fund flows in the sample period from January 1994
to December 2008 for funds registered in 48 countries around the world (Table 1). There are 8641 hedge funds with monthly
returns, assets under management and other fund-specific information over this sample period and includes live and defunct
hedge funds, regardless of the reason for defunctness. Therefore, we do not have survivorship bias due to defunct funds in our
sample. Note in our statistical and regression analyses we control for backfilling of returns by excluding the first 18 fund months
from the sample since funds have a tendency to first report to data vendors once they have shown better performance. Further, to
estimate 3-year alpha, we request that funds have at least 36 observations. Our sample includes 2073 (“3-year alpha”) and 4038
(“1-year alpha”) hedge funds. We merge the dataset with information on hedge fund regulation that significantly varies across
countries and to a smaller degree also varies across time (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2007).
3.2. Summary statistics
Table 2 defines and summarizes the performance measures in the data for the January 1994-December 2008 period, as well as
the regulatory variables and variables for hedge fund characteristics. The 3-year alpha is estimated using Fung and Hsieh (2004)
Fig. 1. Typical parties appointed to operate a hedge fund. Administrator: records and bookkeeping and independently verifyasset value ofthe fund; Registrar/Transfer
Agent: process subscriptions and redemptions and maintain registrar of shareholders; Custodian: safe-keeping of assets; Prime Broker: provides access to stock and
loan financing, as well as a host of value-added services; on the basis of: PriceWaterhouseCoopers http://www.pwchk.com.
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Regulation of hedge funds by country.
This table summarizes by country the regulation of hedge funds across 48 countries, including the minimum capital requirements, permissible marketing channels and whether there exists restrictions on the location of
key service providers. The minimum capital requirements to operate as a hedge fund manager vary in some countries depending on fund characteristics and as such are proxied, as summarized in this table, for the purpose
of empirical analyses in the subsequent tables (and the results are robust to alternative proxies). Most regulation variables are rather stable over years, however, some of them do change over time. In this case, we report














































English French German Scandinavian
Algeria 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8100
Anguilla 23 500,000 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 8800
Australia 15 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 37,500
Austria 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 39,000
Bahamas 169 25,000 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 22,700
Barbados 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19,700
Bermuda 547 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 69,900
Brazil 18 362,000 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 9700
Canada 53 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 38,200
Canary
Islands
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 29,600
Cayman
Islands
2696 500,000 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 43,800
Chile, Rep. of 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14,400
Curacao 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 11,400
Cyprus 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27,100
Denmark 3 4,658,000 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 37,100
Dominican
Rep.
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9200
Estonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21,800
Finland 1 183,750 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 35,500
France 70 183,750 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 33,800
Germany 10 441,000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 0 0 1 0 34,400
Gibraltar 6 46,750 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 38,200
Guernsey 192 46,750 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 0 1 0 0 0 44,600
Hong Kong 2 360,000 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 5 0 1 0 0 0 42,000
Ireland 265 933,450 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 45,600
Isle of Man 46 140,250 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 0 0 0 35,000
Israel 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20,800
Italy 35 1,470,000 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 31,000
Japan 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 33,800
Jersey 62 46,750 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 0 0 1 0 0 57,000
Liechtenstein 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 25,000
Luxembourg 380 183,750 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 80,800
Macedonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8400
Malta 9 183,750 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 23,200
Mauritius 15 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 11,900











































































































English French German Scandinavian
Netherlands 15 183,750 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 1 0 1 0 0 38,600
Netherlands
Antilles
68 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 16,000
New Zealand 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 27,300
Panama 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7100
South Africa 10 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 10,600
St. Kitts &
Nevis




3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3600
Sweden 8 183,750 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 1 0 0 0 1 36,900
Switzerland 81 184,000 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 1 0 0 1 0 39,800
United Arab
Emirates
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 55,200
United
Kingdom
19 73,500 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 35,300





































































27-factor model for every 3-year return data, winsorized at the 99% level due to the outliers. The average 3-year alpha (1-year
alpha) is 0.310 (0.125), with a median at 0.278 (0.140). Minimum capitalization ranges from $0 to $6.75 million. Among the funds
in the sample, 52.7% are domiciled in a jurisdiction that restricts the location of key service providers, while 95.2% are associated
with a distribution channel via private placement, 28.8% via investment managers, 5.4% via fund distribution companies, 55.4%
through banks, and 5.6% via the way of wrappers.
5 About 39.5% of the funds are simultaneously managed by fund managers that
manage more than one fund. Only 5.8% of the observations are from funds that have annual capital redemptions. About 18.6% of
5 Oftentimes, multiple distribution channels are allowed in a speciﬁc jurisdiction. Therefore these statistics do not add up to 100%.
Table 2
Definitions of variables and summary statistics.
This table defines the main variables used in the paper. Summary statistics are also provided for each variable. The data are for the period January 1994-
December 2008.




3-year Alpha 3-year alpha is estimated using Fung and Hsieh (2004)
7-factor model for every 3-year return data (99% winsorized).
The first 18 months of returns are eliminated for each fund
due to the possibility of backfilling.
0.310 0.278 1.212 -4.158 4.728
1-year Alpha 1-year alpha is estimated using Fung and Hsieh (2004)
7-factor model for every 1-year return data (99% winsorized).
The first 18 months of returns are eliminated for each fund
due to the possibility of backfilling.




The minimum capitalization required to operate as a hedge
fund manager in 2004 US dollars




A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country imposes
restrictions on the location of key service providers.
0.527 1 0.499 0 1
Marketing investment
manager dummy
A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country allows fund
distribution via investment managers




A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country allows fund
distribution via fund distribution companies
0.054 0 0.226 0 1
Marketing bank A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country allows fund
distribution via banks
0.554 1 0.497 0 1
Marketing via
wrappers dummy
A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country allows fund
distribution via wrappers
0.056 0 0.229 0 1
Marketing via private
placements dummy
A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country allows fund
distribution via private placements




A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country allows fund
distribution via other regulated financial intermediary




A dummy variable equal to 1 where the country allows fund
distribution via non-regulated financial intermediary




A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is run by a fund
manager running 2 or more funds
0.395 0 0.489 0 1
Annual redemption A dummy variable equal to 1 if capital redemptions are
possible only on an annual basis
0.058 0 0.234 0 1
Assets under
management
The fund's assets in million of 2004 US dollars $111.000 $20 $705.000 $0 $23,700
Minimum investment The minimum investment required for the fund in millions of
2004 US dollars
$2.000 $0.25 $63.500 $0.00 $5000.00
Master-feeder A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is a master-feeder
fund (an investment vehicle that pools their portfolio within
another vehicle)
0.186 0 0.389 0 1
Misreporting fund A dummy variable equal to one if the fund frequently (more
than 50%) report returns fall in (0, 0.0058] (following Bollen
and Pool, 2009)
0.625 1 0.484 0 1
Country GNP and legal
origin
GNP per capita The country's GNP per capita, expressed in 2004 US dollars $36,547 $38,500 $7112 $0 $71,400
English origin A dummy variable equal to one for English legal origin
countries (La Porta et al., 1998)
0.923 1 0.266 0 1
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Comparison tests.
We group our sample into quartiles based on the rank of their 3-year alpha during the benchmark period. The bottom (top) quartile includes the worst (best)
performers during the benchmark period. We then tabulate the proportion of the funds that remain in the same rank (quartile) during the subsequent 3-year
period conditional on the regulation variables and fund characteristics. The 2-tailed p-values for the differences in proportions are reported in the last
column. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
No minimum capitalization Minimum capitalization>0 Difference tests
All 33.08% 34.92% 0.004***
Bottom quartile 27.58% 38.81% 0.000***
2nd quartile 30.50% 33.85% 0.009***
3rd quartile 33.81% 29.32% 0.000***
Top quartile 38.31% 36.97% 0.295
No restrictions on location Restrictions on location Difference tests
All 34.05% 32.87% 0.097*
Bottom quartile 27.20% 25.86% 0.354
2nd quartile 33.68% 34.46% 0.626
3rd quartile 33.60% 31.79% 0.186
Top quartile 39.69% 38.61% 0.449
No private placements Private placements Difference tests
All 37.83% 33.30% 0.014**
Bottom quartile 23.53% 26.68% 0.342
2nd quartile 49.03% 33.15% 0.000***
3rd quartile 25.90% 32.91% 0.118
Top quartile 46.82% 38.99% 0.076*
No bank distributions Bank distributions Difference tests
All 33.77% 33.18% 0.409
Bottom quartile 27.41% 25.73% 0.247
2nd quartile 32.04% 35.60% 0.011**
3rd quartile 33.87% 31.51% 0.084*
Top quartile 39.43% 38.93% 0.724
No fund distribution company distributions Fund distribution company distributions Difference tests
All 33.42% 34.55% 0.490
Bottom quartile 26.62% 24.76% 0.556
2nd quartile 33.66% 39.52% 0.041**
3rd quartile 33.00% 26.52% 0.069*
Top quartile 38.95% 44.90% 0.095*
No investment manager distributions Investment manager distributions Difference tests
All 34.01% 32.18% 0.019**
Bottom quartile 27.76% 23.53% 0.008***
2nd quartile 33.85% 34.40% 0.712
3rd quartile 32.86% 32.49% 0.791
Top quartile 40.06% 36.81% 0.045***
No wrapper distributions Wrapper distributions Difference tests
All 33.48% 33.41% 0.962
Bottom quartile 26.67% 23.94% 0.381
2nd quartile 33.63% 39.80% 0.028**
3rd quartile 32.97% 27.55% 0.113
Top quartile 39.19% 39.50% 0.93
No other regulated financial intermediary distributions Other regulated financial intermediary distributions Difference tests
All 33.46% 33.69% 0.854
Bottom quartile 26.88% 23.14% 0.125
2nd quartile 32.98% 41.96% 0.000***
3rd quartile 33.31% 24.23% 0.001***
Top quartile 39.07% 41.28% 0.462
No other non-regulated financial intermediary distributions Other non-regulated financial intermediary distributions Difference tests
All 33.44% 35.63% 0.412
Bottom quartile 26.63% 20.59% 0.264
2nd quartile 33.91% 38.79% 0.273
3rd quartile 32.79% 30.00% 0.622
Top quartile 39.03% 51.52% 0.039**
1012 D. Cumming et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2012) 1005–1022the funds are structured as master-feeder fund, which is an investment vehicle that pools their portfolio within another vehicle. It
is notable that about 62.5% of the funds are misreporting funds, which according to Bollen and Pool (2009) and Cumming and Dai
(2010b) are those funds that frequently (more than 50%) report returns falling in (0, 0.0058]. The assets under management of
the funds range from $0 (funds that became defunct) to $23.7 billion, with an average of $111 million. These summary statistics
are consistent with that reported in other hedge fund datasets.
In Table 3, we group our sample into quartiles based on the rank of their 3-year alpha during the benchmark period. The bottom
(top)quartilerepresentstheworst(best)performersduringthebenchmarkperiod.Wethentabulatetheproportionofthefundsthat
remain in the same rank (quartile) during the subsequent 3-year period. However, we note that this only provides unconditional
evidence as we don't control for regulation variables and fund characteristics. Therefore these results present only preliminary
evidence. We show in general, unconditional on regulation and fund characteristics, the top performers exhibit greater performance
persistence, or notable higher proportion of funds keep staying in the top quartile in the subsequent 3-year period. Further, overall,
funds in jurisdictions with minimum capitalization exhibit greater performance persistence, while funds in jurisdictions with
restrictionsonlocationsandpermittingdistributionsviainvestmentmanagerexhibitsmallerperformancepersistence.Moreover,we
find that different regulations have distinctive effects on the performance persistence of poorly performing funds and better
performing ones. For instance, we observe greater performance persistence among poorly performing funds (the last two quartiles
based on performance during the benchmark period) in jurisdictions with minimum capitalization requirements and permitting
distributions via banks, fund distribution companies, wrappers, and other regulated financial intermediaries. On the other hand, the
betterperformingfundsaremorelikelytostayinthesamerankinjurisdictionswithnominimumcapitalizationrequirementandnot
permitting distributions via private placement and banks, investment managers, and other regulated financial intermediaries.
Table 3 also suggests that performance persistence is conditional on various fund characteristics. Overall, master-feeder funds
and multi-funds show smaller performance persistence. Further, the association is dependent on the previous performance of the
funds. For example, for funds in the bottom two quartiles, annual redemption is associated with weaker performance persistence.
In contrast, it is associated with greater performance persistence for funds in the top two quartiles. Master-feeder funds exhibit
significantly smaller performance persistence in both the bottom and top quartiles. Further, multi-funds show greater
performance persistence in the middle two quartiles, while smaller persistence in the bottom quartile. Moreover, we find that
misreporting funds in the middle two quartiles show greater performance persistence than non-misreporting funds. On the
contrary, among the top quartile and the bottom quartile, non-misreporting funds exhibit greater performance.
4. Multivariate tests
4.1. Regression models
Our multivariate tests assess performance persistence by examining the relationship between current 3-year Fung and Hsieh
(2004) 7-factor alphas and prior 3-year alphas (lagged 3 years so that there is no overlap in measurement. Our dataset is
Table 3 (continued)
No minimum capitalization Minimum capitalization>0 Difference tests
All 34.06% 35.76% 0.166
Bottom quartile 35.36% 28.87% 0.062*
2nd quartile 33.17% 24.24% 0.000***
3rd quartile 30.25% 41.79% 0.000***
Top quartile 37.36% 40.12% 0.226
Not master-feeder fund Master-feeder fund Difference tests
All 33.88% 31.14% 0.002***
Bottom quartile 31.63% 23.09% 0.000***
2nd quartile 32.68% 34.49% 0.284
3rd quartile 31.06% 31.99% 0.574
Top quartile 39.52% 33.33% 0.002***
Not multi-funds Multi-funds Difference tests
All 34.72% 33.38% 0.036**
Bottom quartile 41.65% 23.12% 0.000***
2nd quartile 30.67% 34.95% 0.001***
3rd quartile 27.23% 36.71% 0.000***
Top quartile 37.77% 37.29% 0.717
Non-misreporting funds Misreporting funds Difference tests
All 32.85% 34.88% 0.000***
Bottom quartile 37.79% 33.10% 0.000***
2nd quartile 24.28% 35.53% 0.000***
3rd quartile 22.14% 34.85% 0.000***
Top quartile 40.14% 35.81% 0.001***
Not annual redemption Annual redemption Difference tests
1013 D. Cumming et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2012) 1005–1022structured as a panel that has 2,073 funds with performance statistics with at least 2-successive periods of 3-year alphas over the
years 1994–2008. One limiting factor is the requirement of a rather long return series of six consecutive years. To determine
whether our results hold if we include more hedge funds in the analyses, we conducted a further calculation that includes the
1-year alpha in addition to the 3-year alpha.
6 This reduces the required time span and consequently increases our sample size to
4038. To test whether our results are prone to a conditioning bias we also calculate “1-year alpha,” and compare the results with
those from the “3-year alpha.” Overall, we find that 1) statistical significance (not surprisingly) increases, but, more importantly
2) the signs of the significant coefficients do not change. Therefore, we find no evidence of a conditioning bias in our results, and
we thus highly believe that our results are representative (see Table 4). The basic structure of our regression equation is:
7−factor alpha ¼ β0 þ β1Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ þ β2Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   MinimumCapitalization
þβ3Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   Restrictions on Location þ β4Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   Private Placement
þβ5Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   Investment Manager þ β6Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   Fund Distribution Company
þβ7Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   Bank þ β8Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   Wrapper þ β9Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ
 Other Regulated Financial Intermediary þ β10Lag 7−factor alpha ðÞ   Non−Regulated Financial Intermediary
þΣiγiControl Variablei þ ε
ð1Þ
Positive coefficients on β2 to β10 imply performance persistence attributable to regulation as historical alphas interacted with
regulatory structures positively predict future alphas and the β1 coefficient is the sole determinant of the degree of return
persistence that cannot be explained by hedge fund regulation. By contrast, insignificant coefficients on β2to β10 imply no
evidence of performance persistence. Negative and significant coefficients for β1, β2, β3, and β4 imply the funds have negative
performance persistence or substantial luck in achieving performance outcomes from one period to the next. The regression
estimates for Eq. (1) appear in Table 4.
As a robustness check, we present in Table 5 regressions with relative quartile rankings of funds, as specified in Eq. (2):
7−factor alpha quartile ranking ¼ β0 þ β1Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ þ β2Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Minimum Capitalization þ β3Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Restrictions on Location þ β4Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Private Placement þ β5Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Investment Manager þ β6Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Fund Distribution Company þ β7Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Bank þ β8Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Wrapper þ β9Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Other Regulated Financial Intermediary þ β10Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Non−Regulated Financial Intermediary þ ΣiγiControl Variablei þ ε
ð2Þ
The coefficients in regression (2) have the same interpretation as in Eq. (1), with the exception that the variables are based on
relative rankings and not the absolute values of alpha as in Eq. (1). Also, Eq. (2) is estimated with ordered logit techniques, while
Eq. (1) is estimated with panel data methods for continuous dependent variables.
As a further robustness check, we present in Table 6 regressions with treatment sample selection regressions (similar to
Heckman, 1976, 1979). These regressions have two steps. The first step (Eq. (3a)) is a binary logit regression for selecting an
offshore registration, and the second step (Eq. (3b)) models the persistence in alpha conditional on selecting an offshore
registration. We assess robustness in Eq. (3b) to the use of 7-factor alphas and relative quartile rankings of 7-factor alphas.
Offshore ¼ β0 þ β1Fund Regulation Variables þ β2Fund Strategy Variables
þ β3Variables for Fund Characteristics such as Size ðÞ þ ε ð3aÞ
7−factor alpha quartile ranking ¼ β0 þ β1Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ þ β2Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Minimum Capitalization þ β3Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Restrictions on Location þ β4Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Private Placement þ β5Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Investment Manager þ β6Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Fund Distribution Company þ β7Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Bank þ β8Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Wrapper þ β9Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ   Other Regulated Financial Intermediary þ β10Lag 7−factor alpha ranking ðÞ
 Non−Regulated Financial Intermediary þ ΣiγiControl Variablei þ β11Offshore þ ε step 3a ðÞ j
ð3bÞ
Of course, there are a variety of ways to specify these two-step regressions. We use strategy variables to identify choice of
offshore versus onshore, consistent with Cumming and Dai (2009, 2010a,b) and Cumming and Johan (2008). In addition, we use
various fund regulation dummy variables. The results for the second step estimates are invariant to different possible
specifications of the first step regressions. Also, as discussed below, the main results of interest are invariant to modeling selection
or not, and various other specification issues.
4.2. Regression results
Table 4 presents the regression results for Eq. (1) with four Panels (A and B are related to 3-year-alphas and A′ and B′ to
1-year-alphas) and 11 regression models in total. Panel A (A′)o fTable 4 shows 5 alternative regression models based on the full
6 We thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Multivariate regressions.
This table presents Panel AR(1) panel (by years and funds) estimates of performance persistence, alongside Panel estimates without AR(1) specifications, and Pooled Regressions with errors clustered by both time and
fund. Panel A considers the full sample of all funds, while Panel B considers subsample based on quartile rankings. The dependent variable for panels A and B (A′ and B′) is the 3-year alpha (1-year alpha) for each fund for
each year (winsorized at 99%). Explanatory variables include the 3 [1]-year alpha (lagged by 3 [1] years), the interaction between lagged alpha and fund regulation variables (minimum capitalization, restrictions on
location, and distribution channels for investment manager, fund distribution company and wrappers), the interaction between lagged alpha and fund characteristics (fund managers that operate multiple funds, master
feeder funds, funds with annual redemptions), log of assets under management, and country factors that include GDP per capita and a dummy variable for English legal origin. Twenty-seven dummy variables are included
for different strategies in the CISDM database (one is excluded to avoid collinearity, and a constant is included in all regressions). Variables are as defined in Table 1. Select variables excluded in different regression to check
for collinearity. Regressions are presented for the full sample, as well as the different quartiles of performance (based on 2006–2008 performance). Data source: CISDM. Sample period: 1994–2008. *, **, *** significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.




Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Panel A. All funds, full sample, 3-year alpha
3-year lagged alpha 0.030 0.479 0.028 0.462 0.033 0.045 0.038 0.625 0.045 0.038 0.072 0.016**
3-year lagged alpha∗Minimum capitalization 0.003 0.020** 0.003 0.042** 0.001 0.004 0.199 0.003*** 0.004 0.199
3-year lagged alpha∗Restrictions on location −0.047 0.008*** −0.041 0.019** −0.059 0.001*** −0.069 0.085*
3-year lagged alpha∗Private placement −0.055 0.194 −0.054 0.154 −0.057 0.132 −0.049 0.251
3-year lagged alpha∗Investment manager −0.061 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha∗Fund distribution company 0.008 0.768
3-year lagged alpha∗Bank 0.043 0.112
3-year lagged alpha∗Wrapper −0.018 0.596 −0.018 0.588 −0.035 0.64
3-year lagged alpha∗Other regulated financial intermediary 0.005 0.865 0.014 0.634 −0.049 0.379
3-year lagged alpha∗Non-regulated financial intermediary −0.021 0.676 −0.075 0.130 0.085 0.421
3-year lagged alpha∗Multiple funds 0.460 0.000*** 0.460 0.000*** 0.460 0.000*** 0.464 0.000*** 0.438 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha∗Master feeder 0.370 0.000*** 0.370 0.000*** 0.369 0.000*** 0.357 0.000*** 0.389 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha∗Annual redemption 0.389 0.000*** 0.389 0.000*** 0.388 0.000*** 0.403 0.000*** 0.337 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha∗Misreporting fund 0.738 0.000*** 0.738 0.000*** 0.738 0.000*** 0.734 0.000*** 0.730 0.000***
Log assets under management −0.014 0.000*** −0.014 0.014 −0.015 0.012** −0.013 0.012** −0.014 0.092* −0.024 0.202
Log GDP per capita −0.026 0.466 −0.026 0.476 −0.026 0.461 −0.023 0.548 −0.053 0.322 −0.604 0.695
English legal origin −0.050 0.247 −0.051 0.240 −0.052 0.225 −0.045 0.333 −0.047 0.229 −0.086 0.108
Constant 0.633 0.107 0.629 0.110 0.644 0.101 0.585 0.166 0.834 0.164 1.452 0.447
Strategy dummy variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated autocorrelation coefficient 0.391 0.392 0.392 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
N 12,597 12,597 12,597 12,597 12,597 12,597
Adjusted R
2 0.6131 0.6131 0.6138 0.6118 0.6200 0.072


































































Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Panel A′. All funds, full sample, 1-year alpha
1-year lagged alpha 0.072 0.000*** 0.072 0.000*** 0.072 0.000*** 0.097 0.000*** 0.175 0.000*** 0.309 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Minimum capitalization 0.004 0.004*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.003 0.042** 0.005 0.001*** 0.004 0.206
1-year lagged alpha∗Restrictions on location −0.053 0.003*** −0.046 0.007*** −0.062 0.000*** −0.099 0.017**
1-year lagged alpha∗Private placement −0.041 0.000*** −0.042 0.000*** −0.039 0.000*** −0.062 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Investment manager −0.051 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Fund distribution company 0.002 0.948
1-year lagged alpha∗Bank 0.016 0.363
1-year lagged alpha∗Wrapper −0.018 0.596 −0.015 0.653 −0.058 0.397
1-year lagged alpha∗Other regulated financial intermediary 0.003 0.912 0.004 0.888 −0.050 0.327
1-year lagged alpha∗Non-regulated financial intermediary −0.029 0.554 −0.073 0.128 0.053 0.613
1-year lagged alpha∗Multiple funds 0.460 0.000*** 0.460 0.000*** 0.460 0.000*** 0.460 0.000*** 0.421 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Master feeder 0.367 0.000*** 0.367 0.000*** 0.366 0.000*** 0.354 0.000*** 0.374 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Annual redemption 0.379 0.000*** 0.379 0.000*** 0.378 0.000*** 0.388 0.000*** 0.309 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Misreporting fund 0.731 0.000*** 0.731 0.000*** 0.732 0.000*** 0.725 0.000*** 0.698 0.000***
Log assets under management −0.011 0.041** −0.012 0.038** −0.012 0.035** −0.011 0.071* −0.007 0.358 −0.013 0.223
Log GDP per capita −0.023 0.507 −0.023 0.504 −0.021 0.544 −0.020 0.585 −0.057 0.255 −0.049 0.206
English legal origin −0.050 0.229 −0.051 0.219 −0.053 0.194 −0.042 0.336 −0.044 0.225 0.018 0.629
Constant 0.5230 0.596 0.535 0.156 0.518 0.168 0.478 0.228 0.786 0.180 0.942 0.084*
Strategy dummy variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated autocorrelation coefficient 0.390 0.390 0.390 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
N 17,258 17,258 17,258 17,258 17,258 17,258
Adjusted R





























































2(7) 1st quartile (Top) (8) 2nd quartile (9) 3rd quartile (10) 4th quartile (Bottom) (11) 4th quartile (Bottom)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Panel B. Full sample by quartiles, 3-year alpha
3-year lagged alpha −0.013 0.262 0.005 0.109 −0.002 0.326 0.001 0.932 0.003 0.800
3-year lagged alpha∗Minimum Capitalization 0.004 0.087*
3-year lagged alpha∗Restrictions on location −0.041 0.015** −0.006 0.212 0.000 0.830 −0.016 0.427 −0.061 0.058*
3-year lagged alpha∗Wrapper −0.157 0.000*** −0.016 0.160 −0.004 0.490 0.154 0.026*
3-year lagged alpha∗Multiple funds 0.301 0.000*** 0.144 0.000*** 0.324 0.000*** 0.357 0.000*** 0.358 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha∗Master feeder 0.231 0.000*** 0.111 0.000*** 0.221 0.000*** 0.451 0.000*** 0.452 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha∗Annual redemption 0.218 0.000*** 0.140 0.000*** 0.176 0.000*** 0.542 0.000*** 0.539 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha∗Misreporting fund 0.530 0.000*** 0.321 0.000*** 0.734 0.000*** 0.591 0.000*** 0.592 0.000***
Log assets under management −0.064 0.000*** 0.001 0.628 −0.001 0.143 0.039 0.000*** 0.039 0.000***
Log GDP per capita −0.062 0.453 −0.028 0.018 −0.004 0.521 −0.008 0.878 −0.010 0.839
English legal origin −0.222 0.044 −0.010 0.425 −0.013 0.016 −0.035 0.647 −0.041 0.598
Constant 2.519 0.003*** 0.658 0.000*** 0.101 0.133 −0.850 0.122 −0.806 0.142
Strategy dummy variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated autocorrelation coefficient 0.295 0.369 0.358 0.285 0.284
N 3004 3621 3508 2464 2464
Adjusted R
2 0.306 0.243 0.7554 0.4503 0.4516
Panel B′. Full sample by quartiles, 1-year alpha
1-year lagged alpha 0.080 0.000*** 0.003 0.094* 0.006 0.074* 0.049 0.000*** 0.047 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Minimum capitalization 0.009 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Restrictions on location −0.042 0.009*** −0.003 0.116 −0.003 0.435 −0.067 0.000*** −0.026 0.347
1-year lagged alpha∗Wrapper −0.123 0.071* −0.007 0.237 −0.013 0.238 0.177 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Multiple funds 0.363 0.000*** 0.324 0.000*** 0.142 0.000*** 0.290 0.000*** 0.287 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Master feeder 0.441 0.000*** 0.221 0.000*** 0.110 0.000*** 0.232 0.000*** 0.231 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Annual redemption 0.524 0.000*** 0.173 0.000*** 0.140 0.000*** 0.207 0.000*** 0.206 0.000***
1-year lagged alpha∗Misreporting fund 0.584 0.000*** 0.734 0.000*** 0.319 0.000*** 0.517 0.000*** 0.516 0.000***
Log assets under management 0.041 0.000*** −0.001 0.199 0.001 0.638 −0.059 0.000*** −0.059 0.000***
Log GDP per capita −0.011 0.827 −0.005 0.456 −0.027 0.024** −0.079 0.321 −0.068 0.392
English legal origin −0.041 0.593 −0.013 0.014** −0.010 0.430 −0.199 0.065 −0.224 0.038**
Constant −0.871 0.108 0.104 0.120 0.644 0.000*** 2.587 0.002*** 2.488 0.003***
Strategy dummy variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated autocorrelation coefficient 0.282 0.369 0.368 0.277 0.284
N 4782 4730 4177 3569 3569
Adjusted R































































This table presents Panel AR(1) panel (by years and funds) estimates of performance persistence with a quartile ranking dependent variable in Model (12),
alongside ordered logit estimates of the quartile ranking without an AR(1) specification in Model (13). In panel A [B] the dependent variable is the 3-year alpha
quartile ranking [1-year alpha quartile ranking] for each fund for each year. Explanatory variables include the 3-year alpha quartile ranking [1-year alpha quartile
ranking] (lagged by 3 [1] years), the interaction between lagged alpha rankings and fund regulation variables (minimum capitalization, restrictions on location,
and distribution channels for investment manager, fund distribution company and wrappers), the interaction between lagged alpha and fund characteristics
(fund managers that operate multiple funds, master feeder funds, funds with annual redemptions), log of assets under management, and country factors that
include GDP per capita and a dummy variable for English legal origin. Twenty-seven dummy variables are included for different strategies in the CISDM database
(one is excluded to avoid collinearity, and a constant is included in all regressions). Ordered logit estimates are presented for clustering by fund. Regression
results, particularly for the fund regulation variable of interest, are not affected by collinearity and/or clustering. Data source: CISDM. Sample period: 1994–2008.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(12) Panel, AR(1) (13) Ordered logit
















Panel A: 3-year alpha quartile ranking
3-year lagged alpha quartile rank 0.033 0.525 0.226 0.030** 0.040 0.016 -0.022 -0.034
3-year lagged alpha
rank∗Minimum capitalization
0.003 0.038** 0.006 0.019** 0.001 0.0004 −0.001 −0.001
3-year lagged alpha
rank∗Restrictions on location
−0.056 0.070* −0.143 0.028** −0.025 −0.010 0.014 0.021
3-year lagged alpha rank∗
Private placement
−0.080 0.116 −0.095 0.346 −0.017 −0.007 0.009 0.014
3-year lagged alpha
rank∗Investment manager
0.031 0.038** 0.067 0.015** 0.012 0.005 −0.007 −0.010
3-year lagged alpha rank∗Fund
distribution company
0.039 0.547 −0.046 0.780 −0.008 −0.003 0.005 0.007





−0.062 0.292 0.004 0.978 0.001 0.0003 −
0.0004
−0.001
3-year lagged alpha rank∗Other
regulated financial
intermediary




0.035 0.518 −0.014 0.886 −0.003 −0.001 0.001 0.002
3-year lagged alpha∗
Multiple funds
0.020 0.027** 0.033 0.043** 0.006 0.002 −0.003 −0.005
3-year lagged alpha rank∗
Master feeder
0.002 0.843 −0.006 0.761 −0.001 −
0.0004
0.001 0.001
3-year lagged alpha rank∗
Annual redemption
0.038 0.014** 0.060 0.029** 0.011 0.004 −0.006 −0.009
3-year lagged alpha
rank∗Misreporting fund
0.011 0.257 0.004 0.857 0.001 0.0003 −
0.0004
−0.001
Log assets under management −0.013 0.120 −0.017 0.244 −0.003 −0.001 0.002 0.003
Log GDP per capita −0.075 0.219 −0.244 0.133 −0.043 −0.017 0.024 0.037
English legal origin 0.221 0.010** 0.356 0.014** 0.058 0.031 −0.030 −0.059
Constant 3.484 0.000***










Panel B: 1-year alpha quartile ranking
1-year lagged alpha quartile rank −0.006 0.586 −0.010 0.707 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.002
1-year lagged alpha
rank∗Minimum capitalization
0.003 0.044** 0.007 0.022** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
1-year lagged alpha
rank∗Restrictions on location
−0.085 0.022** −0.184 0.010*** −0.027 −0.019 0.013 0.032
1-year lagged alpha rank∗
Private placement
−0.041 0.005*** −0.113 0.001*** −0.017 −0.011 0.008 0.020
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Investment manager 0.038 0.024** 0.076 0.017** 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.013
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Fund distribution
company
−0.024 0.713 −0.205 0.247 0.030 0.021 −0.015 −0.036
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Bank 0.003 0.922 0.027 0.628 −0.004 −0.003 0.002 0.005
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Wrapper −0.014 0.819 0.120 0.472 −0.018 −0.012 0.009 0.021
1018 D. Cumming et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2012) 1005–1022sample of all funds in the dataset. Models (1)–(3) use panel methods with an AR(1) specification to account for the fact that there
is autocorrelation in the error terms. Different independent variables are used in Models (1)–(3). Model (4) uses panel method
without the AR(1) correction. Models (5) and (6) use a pooled regression and cluster the standard errors by period and fund
(based on Petersen, 2009). Model (6) is presented to show the benchmark results without regulatory variables (which shows
performance persistence). Panel B (B′) uses the full sample of all funds but breaks the data into four quartiles based on the fund's
lagged 7-factor alphas for the regression models.
Table 4 provides strong statistical support for Hypothesis 1 for a positive association between minimum capitalization and
performance persistence. The effect is statistically significant in Models (1)–(4) in Panel A (A′) and in Model (11) in Panel B (B′).
However, the effect is not economically large. To see the size of the effect, consider a 1-standard deviation change in alpha from
the mean for hedge funds that operates in jurisdictions with $1 million minimum capitalization versus hedge funds that operate
in jurisdictions with $5 million minimum capitalization. The data indicate that, for the larger $5 million minimum capitalization
jurisdictions, prior lagged 3-year alphas (1-year alphas) are more closely related to future alphas by only 0.003 (0.004) or 0.3%
(0.4%). This small economic significance is perhaps not surprising, as hedge funds themselves are very large while minimum
capitalization restrictions across countries are comparatively small (Table 1), thereby keeping only the smallest of the marginal
funds. In Panel B (B′) in Model (11) for the subset of bottom quartile funds we provide evidence that size of the effect is very
similar to that reports in Panel A (A′). For other quartiles considered in Panel B (B′), the effect for minimum capitalization is not
significant (and hence not included in the regressions), which is intuitive since minimum capitalization levels are quite small
(Table 1) and hence impact only the most marginally operating funds.
Table 4 provides strong statistical and economic support for Hypothesis 2 for restrictions on the location of key service
providers. The effect is statistically significant in Panel A (A′) for all models. To see the size of the effect, consider a 1-standard
deviation difference in alpha from the mean for hedge funds that operates in a jurisdiction with restrictions on location versus
funds that do not operate in a jurisdiction with restrictions on location. The data indicate that, for the jurisdiction with restrictions
on the location of key service providers, prior lagged 3-year alphas (1-year alphas) are less closely related to future alphas by 4.7%
(5.3%). Further, note that the effect of restrictions on location is negative and significant in Panel B (B′) for Model (7) (for the top
quartile funds) and in Model (11) (for the bottom quartile funds). The effect is only robust for the top quartile funds for
1-year-alphas as shown with Model (7) in Panel B′. Hence, the impact of restrictions on location is more detrimental to top
quartile funds.
The data shows no statistical support for Hypothesis 3. The coefficients for Bank interacted with lagged alpha and Other
Regulated Financial Intermediary interacted with lagged alpha are positive but insignificant.
The data indicate mixed statistical support for Hypothesis 4 for distribution channels that make fund performance more
opaque in Table 4. In Panel A (A′), the coefficient for Investment Managers interacted with lagged alpha is negative and
significant, and also for Private Placements interacted with lagged alpha in Panel A′ but the other coefficients are insignificant. In
Panel B (B′), there is stronger support for a negative association with wrappers and performance persistence in Model (7) for top
quartile funds. To see the size of the effect, consider a 1-standard deviation difference in alpha from the mean for hedge funds that
operates in a jurisdiction with wrapper distributions versus funds that do not operate in a jurisdiction with wrapper distributions.
The data indicate that, for the jurisdiction with wrapper distributions, prior lagged 3-year alphas are less closely related to future
alphas by between 15.7% (Model 7) for the top quartile, but more closely related to future alphas by 15.4% for funds in the bottom
quartile (Model 10) (the effect is insignificant for the other quartiles). Simply put, wrappers hurt performance persistence for top
quartile funds, but for bottom quartile funds wrappers enable persistently bad performance. The data thus provide very strong
support for Hypothesis 4 for wrappers.
Table 5 (continued)
(12) Panel, AR(1) (13) Ordered logit
















Panel B: 1-year alpha quartile ranking
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Other regulated financial intermediary −0.086 0.003*** −0.081 0.201 0.012 0.008 −0.006 −0.014
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Non-regulated financial intermediary −0.012 0.850 −0.104 0.373 0.015 0.011 −0.008 −0.018
1-year lagged alpha∗Multiple funds 0.014 0.163 0.027 0.158 −0.004 −0.003 0.002 0.005
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Master feeder 0.009 0.476 −0.007 0.758 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Annual redemption 0.046 0.008*** 0.066 0.032** −0.010 −0.007 0.005 0.012
1-year lagged alpha rank∗Misreporting fund 0.009 0.432 0.012 0.620 −0.002 −0.001 0.001 0.002
Log assets under management −0.009 0.325 −0.013 0.442 0.002 0.001 −0.001 −0.002
Log GDP per capita −0.168 0.049** −0.264 0.082* 0.039 0.027 −0.019 −0.046
English legal origin 0.229 0.007*** 0.243 0.110 −0.038 −0.022 0.021 0.040
Constant 4.416 0.000***
Strategy dummy variables? Yes Yes




2 for ordered logit) 0.0468 0.0235
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positive and statistically significant as well as economically large. The regressions in Table 4 are presented for winsorized alphas
at the 99% level. When we winsorize at the 95%, these results are not as significant or as large. Therefore, we consider and
explicitly show robustness with an alternative approach with the use of quartile ranks.
The regressions for relative quartile rankings (Eq. (2)) are presented in Table 5. The results are consistent with Table 4 in that
they show very strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Furthermore, the statistical and economic significance of the effects for
minimum capitalization and restrictions on location are very similar for Table 5 as they are for Table 4. We note, however, that
there is less consistent support for Hypothesis 3 and 4 in terms of the effects on performance from distribution channels. Further,
note in Table 5 that the control variables for misreporting funds, multifunds, master-feeder funds and funds with annual
redemptions are not as statistically and/or as economically large as in Table 4, given the modeling takes away any possible outliers
with the specification Eq. (2) for Table 5.
Table 6 presents regression estimates of Eq. (3) for sample selection for non-random jurisdiction choice. Regardless of the first
step-sample selection model and/or the use of 7-factor alphas or relative rankings of 7-factor alphas, the data again provide strong
support the propositions that minimum capitalization facilitates performance persistence (Hypothesis 1) while restrictions on
location mitigate performance persistence (Hypothesis 2). The statistical and economic significance is very similar to the results
presented in Tables 4 and 5. As before, however, there is mixed support for Hypothesis 3 and 4 in terms of the effect of
distribution channels.
Overall, the data herein strongly support the predictions that minimum capitalization facilitates performance persistence,
particularly for bottom quartile funds. These findings are consistent with other work which shows minimum capitalization
reduces the left tail of performance figures and hence raises average performance levels (Cumming and Dai, 2010a) and increases
flows to funds (Cumming and Dai, 2009). Furthermore, the data herein show restrictions on location of key service providers
mitigate performance persistence, particularly for top quartile funds. This evidence is consistent with other work which shows
Table 6
Two-step treatment sample selection regressions for offshore registrants.
This table presents treatment regressions of performance persistence based on a quartile ranking dependent variable in Model (14) and the continuous alpha
dependent variable in Model (15). The dependent variable in the step (a) regressions is a dummy variable for offshore registrants. The dependent variable in step
(b) of Model (14) is the 3-year alpha quartile ranking for each fund for each year and in Model (15) is the actual 3-year alpha. Explanatory variables include the
3-year alpha quartile ranking (lagged by 3 years), the interaction between lagged alpha rankings and fund regulation variables (minimum capitalization,
restrictions on location, and distribution channels for investment manager, fund distribution company and wrappers), the interaction between lagged alpha and
fund characteristics (fund managers that operate multiple funds, master feeder funds, funds with annual redemptions), log of assets under management, and
country factors that include GDP per capita and a dummy variable for English legal origin. Twenty-seven dummy variables are included for different strategies in
the CISDM database (one is excluded to avoid collinearity, and a constant is included in all regressions). Regressions are presented for the full sample. Regression
results, particularly for the fund regulation variable of interest, are not affected by collinearity. Data source: CISDM. Sample period: 1994–2008. *, **, *** Significant
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(14) Treatment sample selection regression
for quartiles










Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
3-year lagged alpha quartile rank (alpha for (24)) 0.121 0.002*** 0.093 0.028
3-Year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗
Minimum capitalization
0.003 0.002*** 0.005 0.001***
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗
Restrictions on location
−0.039 0.055* −0.065 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗Private placement −0.035 0.329 −0.045 0.281
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗Wrapper 0.023 0.351 −0.0295 0.371
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗
Other regulated financial intermediary
−0.133 0.000*** −0.057 0.042**
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗
Non-regulated financial intermediary
0.125 0.005*** 0.151 0.002***
3-year lagged alpha (alpha for (24))∗Multiple funds 0.018 0.006*** 0.454 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗Master feeder −0.009 0.291 0.381 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗Annual redemption 0.048 0.000*** 0.333 0.000***
3-year lagged alpha rank (alpha for (24))∗Misreporting fund 0.000 0.993 0.7316 0.000***
Misreporting fund 0.050 0.278 0.050 0.2780
Log assets under management 0.118 0.000*** −0.013 0.033** 0.118 0.000*** −0.019 0.000***
Log GDP per capita −0.861 0.000*** −0.135 0.004*** −0.861 0.000*** −0.084 0.001***
English legal origin −0.417 0.000*** 0.087 0.189 −0.417 0.000*** −0.054 0.046**
Offshore −0.008 0.881 −0.003 0.863
Strategy dummy variables? Yes No Yes No
Fund regulation dummy variables for distributions
and restrictions on location?
Yes No Yes No
Constant 4.490 0.000*** 3.871 0.000*** 4.490 0.000*** 1.298 0.000***
Lambda 0.089** -0.016
N 12,597 12,597
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(Cumming and Dai, 2009). Also, there is evidence in the data presented herein of less performance persistence among top quartile
funds for wrapper distributions, but also evidence of more performance persistence among bottom quartile funds for wrapper
distributions. Again, this evidence is consistent with other work which shows wrapper distributions are associated with lower
levels of fund performance (Cumming and Dai, 2010a) and flatter or less sensitive flow-performance relationships (Cumming and
Dai, 2009). The contribution here is unique by showing that performance persistence among intermediaries is affected by
regulation, which is important for hedge fund managers and regulators alike, as well as other types of investors and
intermediaries.
4.3. Additional robustness checks
We carried out a number of other robustness checks in the course of our analyses, but do not explicitly present the regressions
for reasons of conciseness, but briefly discuss these results here. We considered differences in the effect of regulation on
persistence by whether or not the fund persistently misreports or smoothes returns. We considered two-step models for funds
that do and do not have consecutive years of performance persistence data. We considered various other control variables that are
available in hedge fund datasets in other specifications not reported but available on request. We further consider robustness to
selection effects in terms of Heckman (1976, 1979) selection for choice other jurisdictions, as well as considered robustness to
excluding certain countries, and robustness to selection for the probability that a fund has survived sufficiently long in the dataset
to report multiperiod returns. Our findings are quite robust and highlight the important role of financial regulation on
performance persistence, particularly in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2 as discussed above.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper proposed the idea that performance persistence can either be enhanced or mitigated by financial regulation. We
tested this idea in the context of the hedge fund industry with data from 48 countries spanning the years 1994–2008.
International and time-series differences in hedge fund regulation exist for minimum capitalization requirements, restrictions on
the location of key service providers, and permissible distribution channels. Overall, the data provide support for the idea the
minimum capitalization enhances performance persistence, while restrictions on location mitigate performance persistence. As
well, we found some evidence consistent with the view that wrapper distributions are associated with lower performance
persistence in ways which differ significantly depending on the quartile ranking of the fund. We do not find evidence that
distribution channels, that promote a fund's presence to institutional investors increases performance persistence. Our findings
are robust to different econometric specifications, controlling for potential selection effects, and alternative measures of
performance (alpha and quartile rankings).
Future work in coming years could consider newly proposed hedge fund regulation in Europe and the U.S. as regulators
contemplate regulatory changes in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Also, future work could consider the impact of regulation
on performance persistence and aspects of financial intermediation in other contexts outside the hedge fund industry.
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